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Citizenship, Welfare, and National Sovereignty in 
Modern Europe 
Evan G. Hebert 
“It’s just obvious you can’t have free immigration and a welfare 
state.” 
- Milton Friedman 
Introduction 
A primary question facing the European Union (EU) is whether 
supranational citizenship – citizenship above and beyond that of an in-
dividual member state – can be reconciled with national sovereignty.1 
The goal for advocates of European citizenship is no less than the cre-
ation of a new society, one which requires “uncoupling civic obligation 
from loyalty to the nation-state.”2 The framework of supranational cit-
izenship, drawing from the discourse of global human rights, confers 
new rights and obligations upon individuals and prefigures the for-
mation of a new European identity.3 As a result of this framework, the 
nation state is no longer the primary generator of citizen rights.4 Rul-
ings from the European Court of Justice (ECJ), specifically on the topic 
of national welfare schemes, have played a decisive role in conferring 
new substantive rights on citizens using the concept of EU citizenship 
and non-discrimination.5 
European citizenship law interpreting the Treaty on the Function-
ing of the European Union’s citizenship provisions provides a prime 
example of how delegation to a supranational authority imbued with 
 
 1.  Theodora Kostakopoulou, Nested “Old” and “New” Citizenships in the European Un-
ion: Bringing Out the Complexity, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 389, 389 (1999) (“The institution 
of European Union citizenship, which was established by the Treaty on European Union, 
has been the subject of considerable attention over the last few years.”).   
 2.  Id. at 392.  
 3.  See id. (arguing that “European citizenship is intimately connected with political par-
ticipation and the formation of a European identity”).  
 4.  Marlene Wind, Post-National Citizenship in Europe: The EU As A “Welfare Rights 
Generator”?, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 239, 242 (2009) (“[I]f we consider the main produc-
ers of new citizen-rights over the past fifty years, the state no longer appears to be the 
most obvious contender.”).  
 5.  Id. 
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powers deriving from a treaty can create a positive cycle whereby the 
court interprets the law in a manner which further increases the scope 
and weight of said treaty.6 The result is a gradual accrual of suprana-
tional power to the European Union at the expense of national sover-
eignty.7 Part I discusses the history of welfare and citizenship in Eu-
rope, starting with the Treaty of Paris and continuing through the 
passage of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU). Part II outlines some of the theoretical debates surrounding 
the status of European citizenship. Part III turns directly to the line of 
citizenship cases and their implications for the European Union. Fi-
nally, Part IV addresses criticism of the ECJ’s citizenship jurispru-
dence, arguing that aggressive enforcement of supranational citizen-
ship rights is necessary to prevent discrimination against European 
citizens and further the ultimate goal of the TFEU – creating a more 
social European Union. 
Immigration and the Welfare State in Modern Europe 
The Rights of European Migrants in Postwar Europe 
European states have negotiated the social entitlements of mi-
grants since long before the creation of the European Coal and Steel 
Community, usually through bilateral agreement.8 In 1951, the Treaty 
of Paris conferred worker mobility rights on workers of proven quali-
fications, establishing a cornerstone of Community law.9 The subse-
quent Treaty of Rome enshrined the freedom of movement, defined as 
“the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between 
workers of the Member States as regards employment, remuneration, 
and other conditions of work and employment.”10 Social protection 
was attached to participation in the labor market, rather than on a 
 
 6.  See infra Part III.B. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen, Social Security Regulation in the EU: The De-Territoriali-
zation of Welfare?, in EU LAW AND THE WELFARE STATE, IN SEARCH OF SOLIDARITY, 
Oxford University Press (2005) at 89, 92 (“Long before the existence of the European 
Coal and Steel Community, the conditions of European labour migration and the social 
entitlements of migrants were negotiated between European states.”).  
 9.  Id. at 92-93.  
 10.  See Agustín José Menéndez, European Citizenship after Martínez Sala and Baumbast: 
Has European Law Become More Human but Less Social? 3 CTR. FOR EUR. STUD., 
WORKING PAPER NO. 11, 2009 (quoting the treaty).  
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universal basis.11 Subsequent directives promulgated under the Treaty 
of Rome extended the principle of free movement of workers to the 
removal of national legislation that discriminated on the basis of na-
tionality and the protection of workers’ families’ right to remain in a 
member state where a worker is employed.12 
The original freedom of movement for workers reflected two re-
alities of postwar Europe—first, the economic need for transnational 
labor flows in order to implement industrial recovery plans, and sec-
ond, the recognition that migrant labor was vulnerable to exploitation 
by national governments with the authority to expel migrants at any 
time.13 Hence, the freedom of movement of workers thus gained a dual 
feature under Community law, regarded both as a functional way to 
regulate interstate labor flows and promote economic efficiency, and 
also as a vehicle for social and political integration between the mem-
ber states.14 The latter view saw the free movement of workers as the 
first step in creating a secondary European political community which 
would ultimately result in an autonomous European citizen with rights 
that were no longer contingent on economic activity.15 
When tension arose between these two goals – labor efficiency 
and socio-political integration – the Court of Justice frequently took an 
idealistic approach expanding the scope of worker rights.16 The worker 
was granted autonomous status with distinct legal rights protected by 
Community law upon moving across borders.17 These rights went 
 
 11.  Martinsen, supra note 8, at 93 (“Social protection as attached to labour mobility was 
initiated by Article 69(4) of the Paris Treaty.”). 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  See Agustín José Menéndez, European Citizenship after Martínez Sala and Baumbast: 
Has European Law Become More Human but Less Social? 3 CTR. FOR EUR. STUD., 
WORKING PAPER NO. 11, 10 (2009) (quoting the treaty).  
 (“Thus, the core and uncontroversial content of Community free movement of workers re-
sulted from both a normative vision of equal rights . . . and from the economic needs of 
the founding six Member States.”). 
 14.  Id. at 6-7 (describing freedom of movement of workers as both a “tool of problem-
solving, the problem being insufficient productive efficiency” and “a vehicle of political 
integration . . . as workers would generate social ties binding across borders”). 
 15.  Id. at 7 (“In the long run . . . the process would result in the affirmation of a status of 
European citizen fully dissociated from engagement into economic activity.”).  
 16.  Id. (“the tension between these two alternative conceptions of free movement was never 
solved . . . but secondary law and the jurisprudence of the Court became influenced by 
the second conception, which percolated into the legal and general public perceptions 
of European integration in general, and of free movement of workers in particular.”). 
 17.  Id. 
 
_HERBET_FINAL 10-26 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/26/2018  11:38 AM 
ILS Journal of International Law  Vol. VI, No. 1 
59 
beyond movement to encompass the right of establishment in another 
member state and the right to provide services across borders.18 Indi-
viduals were granted the status of worker in certain cases despite not 
being entirely economically active based on their relationship to a 
worker or previous employment in the member state.19 Step by step, 
Community law went from protecting migrant workers as a source of 
labor to treating them as autonomous persons with freedom of action.20 
Community law thus took the first steps toward protecting non-
economically active individuals.21 Residence directives passed in June 
1990 granted the right of free movement to students, retirees, and eco-
nomically inactive persons, but with a catch – those seeking to exercise 
the right had to demonstrate that they had health insurance and would 
not become a burden on the social welfare of a member state.22 This 
gave the member states a role in approving what for practical purposes 
represented a residence permit, so immigration of European persons 
was still a matter of national concern.23 Again, the focus remained on 
the value that migrating workers could provide to the host nation, re-
flecting the economic basis for free movement.24 In 1992, the Maas-
tricht Treaty codified these rights as part of the concept of Union citi-
zenship without substantively changing the law.25 
Today, the rights of European migrants flow from two treaty pro-
visions. Article 18 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union [ex. Article 12 EC] establishes that “within the scope of the ap-
plication of the treaties . . . any discrimination on the grounds of na-
tionality shall be prohibited.”26 Article 21 of the same treaty states, 
“Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside 
freely within the territory of the Member States, subject to the 
 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. at 9. 
 20.  Id. at 11 (stating that “free movement of workers was defined, together with freedom 
of provisions and receipt of services and freedom of establishment, as concrete mani-
festations of a larger personal freedom of action, and concretely a freedom of movement 
of persons”).  
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Martinsen, supra note 8, at 94.  
 23.  Id.  
 24.  See Martinsen, supra note 8, at 93-94. 
 25.  Martinsen, supra note 8, at 94 (stating that the Maastricht Treaty “merely codified the 
right which had already been adopted by the residence directives”).  
 26.  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 18, 
May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 56 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
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limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaties and by the 
measures adopted to give them effect.”27 Although this provision 
seems relatively clear on its face, at the time when the TFEU came into 
force it left more questions than it answered. What constituted “dis-
crimination” under Article 18? What “limitations” would Article 21 be 
subject to, and would national legislation be required for these rights 
to be enforceable? These questions were largely left open to interpre-
tation. It would take a series of rulings by the European Court of Justice 
to resolve many of the issues surrounding how to interpret the new 
concept of EU citizenship in the context of social welfare policy.28 
The Development of the Modern Welfare State in Europe 
In the modern EU, welfare policy is inextricably tied with immi-
gration and citizenship.29 Indeed, national welfare policy intersects 
with many of the freedoms granted by European citizenship, specifi-
cally the freedom of movement of persons, nondiscrimination, and the 
freedom of establishment.30 When member state legislation erects bar-
riers to those freedoms, they must be based on objective considerations 
and proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.31 If a member state 
seeks to withdraw European citizenship from a person, it must base its 
argument for doing so in European, rather than national, law.32 
Social citizenship and the welfare state grew up at the same time 
that modern neoliberal capitalism took shape, complementing the eco-
nomic system despite inherent contradictions between the two by 
 
 27.  TFEU art. 21. 
 28.  See Hadas Alexandra Jacobi, A Fürstin by Any Other Name? European Citizenship and 
the Limits of Individual Rights in the E.C.J., 17 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 643, 651 (2011) 
(“Thus, the question arises whether rights derived from an individual’s EU citizenship 
are more like less-enforceable, and subsequentially less meaningful, human rights; or 
more like institutionally-backed national rights. It is with regard to this question that the 
role of the ECJ comes into prominence.”).  
 29.  See Magnus Ryner, European Welfare State Transformation and Migration, in 
MICHAEL BOMMES & ANDREW GEDDES, IMMIGRATION AND WELFARE: CHALLENGING 
THE BORDERS OF THE WELFARE STATE 51, 51 (2d ed. 2005) (“[W]elfare state restructur-
ing and migration condition one and other in EU member states and . . . affect[] our 
understanding of contemporary forms of social citizenship). 
 30.  See Kostakopoulou, infra note 78, at 652-55.  
 31.  Kostakopoulou, infra note 78, at 658. 
 32.  Dennis-Jonathan Mann & Kai P. Purnhagen, The Nature of Union Citizenship Between 
Autonomy and Dependency on (Member) State Citizenship - A Comparative Analysis of 
the Rottmann Ruling, or: How to Avoid A European Dred Scott Decision?, 29 WIS. 
INT’L L.J. 484, 489-90 (2011). 
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mitigating capitalism’s worst abuses using the tax revenue base gener-
ated by business expansion.33 The regulatory welfare state also pro-
vides a predictable foundation for allocating labor and creates the basis 
for consumer spending.34 Thus, especially early on, the possibility for 
positive-sum gains for both labor and capital allowed for the growth of 
the welfare state in tandem with modern capitalism.35 
Today, this relationship is somewhat more strained.36 In many 
member states, universal entitlement as a basis for allocating social 
welfare has given way to means testing and fears of “benefit tour-
ism.”37 These fears drive social stratification of migrants, seen as a bur-
den on the state’s benefit programs, in a destructive spiral that furthers 
skepticism of immigrant populations.38 Moreover, the very notion of 
means testing is antithetical to the concept of entitlement under supra-
national citizenship, especially when the national government of the 
member state is the one conducting the “test.”39 It relegates social 
rights to the status of economic rights, no longer a substantive guaran-
tee of a certain standard of living to all, but rather a safety net for those 
 
 33.  Id. at 55-56.  
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id.; see also Gøsta Esping-Andersen, After the Golden Age? Welfare State Dilemmas 
in a Global Economy, in WELFARE STATES IN TRANSITION: NATIONAL ADAPTATIONS IN 
GLOBAL ECONOMIES 1 (Gøsta Esping-Andersen ed. 1996) (“The modern welfare state 
became an intrinsic part of capitalism’s postwar ‘Golden Age’, an era in which prosper-
ity, equality, and full employment seemed in perfect harmony.”).  
 36.  See Ryner, supra note 29, at 52 (noting increasing welfare privatization).  
 37.  Ryner, supra note 29, at 52 (stating that “[p]ublic ‘welfare’ is increasingly a lower qual-
ity product, subject to means tests, and is reserved for the ‘deserving poor’, who cannot 
afford private provision and/or pose an ‘unacceptable risk’ for insurance providers”). 
Recall that the “benefit tourism” concern was validated by the ECJ in D’Hoop, 2002 
E.C.R. I-06191 ¶ 29.  
 38.  Ryner, supra note 29, at 53 (“Xenophobia and social divisions immanent in the patterns 
of socio-economic and political restructuring also feed into each other and drive these 
social groups apart”).  
 39.  Ryner, supra note 29, at 52-56 (“Means-testing, with its ipso facto particularism and 
state discretion has very little to do with citizenship at all. Despite its ‘social dimension’, 
it is this type of social welfare regime that the current patterns of European integration 
contribute[] towards, with the emphasis placed squarely on economic rights.”) (“Means 
testing, by its very nature, implies top-down imposition. The state decides who are the 
‘deserving’, and what conditions one has to fulfil in order to be classed as deserving. 
Universalist programmes imply less surveillance and control of clients, and are thus 
more compatible with the idea of rights.”).  
 
_HERBET_FINAL 10-26 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/26/2018  11:38 AM 
2018  University of Baltimore School of Law 
62 
unlucky enough to be unable to participate in the market.40 The former 
view has a universalist, collectivist ethos, while the latter is an individ-
ualistic, status-oriented approach to welfare – one that sees beneficiar-
ies as merely the losers in a depoliticized economy.41 
The universalist and individualist approaches to welfare exist as 
competing ideologies within the European Union, with many dialecti-
cal permutations.42 The individualistic, status-oriented welfare regime 
is present mainly in continental Europe and the UK.43 Welfare is lim-
ited to status-based transfer payments aimed at creating a social safety 
net, means testing is enforced to determine eligibility, and government 
assistance is the exception, rather than the norm.44 The more expansive, 
social approach to welfare, is associated with the Scandinavian na-
tions.45 A collectivist ideology – emanating from the strength of the 
labor movement, prevails as the hegemonic social force, and universal 
entitlements that cover the needs of the whole of society are the norm.46 
A “dense network of policies and regulations” ensures that social ser-
vices protect labor, and entitlements are thus premised on the basis of 
citizenship, rather than means or status.47 
Overall, member states falling into the second category spend less 
per capita on social services.48 While nationalism played a role in the 
development of social systems in all of postwar Europe, the nations 
 
 40.  Ryner, supra note 29, at 56 (noting that under means-tested systems, the norms sur-
rounding welfare are “hardly distinguishable from the norms associated with the tradi-
tional liberal ‘economic rights’ as opposed to ‘social rights.’”).  
 41.  Ryner, supra note 29, at 56; see generally SLAVOJ ZIZEK, THE TICKLISH SUBJECT 353-
55 (Verso, 1999) (defining the depoliticization of the economy as “the common ac-
ceptance of Capital and market mechanisms as neutral tools/procedures to be ex-
ploited”).   
 42.  Ryner, supra note 29, at 57. 
 43.  Ryner, supra note 29, at 57; see also Ramón Peña Casas, Working Paper, Minimum 
Income Standards in Enlarged EU: Guaranteed Minimum Income Schemes, EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, VS/2005/0376, http://www.eapn.ie/pdfs/ (describing these regimes as le-
gitimizing state intervention only when the market has failed, requiring means testing, 
and emphasizing individual circumstances, and contrasting them with social democratic 
schemes that retain a universalistic bent). 
 44.  Ryner, supra note 29, at 57 (describing the residual liberal welfare state regime and the 
conservative status-oriented welfare regime).  
 45.  Id. (describing the “social democratic regime”).  
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id.   
 48.  Ryner, supra note 29, at 57; see also EUROSTAT, SOCIAL PROTECTION STATISTICS 1 
(2016), http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/ (showing each coun-
try’s social protection expenditures per capita and as a percentage of GDP). 
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that tied welfare arrangements to nation-building rather than more ab-
stract social rights were those falling in the more conservative, indi-
vidualist camp.49 Still, as a general matter the development of the wel-
fare state was premised on a concept of national sovereignty that 
included a restrictive, national orientation toward citizenship.50 
Thus, the welfare states of the European Economic Community 
first afforded limited welfare benefits to “guest workers” despite their 
status outside the social citizenry on the basis that their migration was 
necessary to alleviate temporary labor shortages.51 But as the Court of 
Justice expanded the rights of workers in a manner that conflicted with 
this purely economic basis for freedom of movement, the national wel-
fare schemes of the individual member states increasingly came under 
judicial scrutiny.52 The Court ruled that the computation of pension 
benefits must count the years a migrant worker spent working in an-
other member state, that member states could not impose greater social 
security contributions of workers who had been working and insured 
in another member state, and that periods of employment in another 
member state must count for the purposes of determining the rights of 
potential job seekers.53 Thus, the pre-Maastricht framework for pro-
tecting the rights of workers was already running into conflicts with 
the national welfare schemes of the individual member states.54 The 
development of European citizenship would lead to even further con-
flict. 
 
 49.  Ryner, supra note 29, at 58 (“The connection between welfare and the ‘national ques-
tion’ is perhaps most explicitly clear in the ‘conservative’ policy regimes.”).  
 50.  Ryner, supra note 29, at 59 (noting the link between national welfare states and “the 
practices and discourses associated with the institutionalisation of national citizenship 
and forms of social belonging oriented towards nationals”). 
 51.  Ryner, supra note 29, at 60 (stating that “the ‘role’ ascribed to guest workers was to be 
a variable in counter-cyclical positive economic state intervention, to be excluded from 
the benefits of nationally specific transfer payment and insurance systems, even when 
they contributed to their financing”).  
 52.  See Menéndez, supra note 10, at 12. 
 53.  See Case C-443/93, Vougioukas v. IdrimaKoinonikonAsphalisseon, 1995 E.C.R. I-4052 
¶¶ 39-41; Case C-18/95, Terhoeve v. Inspecteur van de BelastingdienstParticulieren, 
1999 E.C.R. I-00345 ¶ 28; Case C-19/92, Dieter Kraus v. Land Baden-Württemberg, 
1993 ECR I-01663, ¶¶ 16-22. 
 54.  Case C-19/92, Dieter Kraus v. Land Baden-Württemberg, 1993 ECR I-01663, ¶¶ 16-
22. 
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In Search of a Theory of European Citizenship 
In its barest sense, citizenship is a system of reciprocal obligations 
between a community and a citizen.55 Liberal communities emerge 
from norms of citizenship that give citizens a shared affinity and a feel-
ing of mutual participation in accomplishing common responsibili-
ties.56 In other words, political communities originate from the bonds 
of citizenship that establish who is in and who is out.57 Traditionally, 
citizenship was defined territorially, in terms of the relationship be-
tween an individual and the nation state.58 
The development of modern citizenship took place in three con-
ceptual phases – civil, political, and social – wherein each expanded 
the scope of the relationship between the citizen and the nation.59 The 
first civil rights developed in the economic field, the most basic and 
fundamental of these being the right to work.60 The recognition of these 
rights was based on the acceptance of a fundamental market ideology, 
namely that restrictions on the pursuit of trade contravened individual 
economic freedom, and worse, were detrimental to the prosperity of 
the nation.61 Gradually, additional rights were attached to citizenship.62 
At the same time, the scope of citizenship – the critical question 
of who could invoke these new rights – expanded to include more in-
dividuals within the political community.63 Eventually, citizens gained 
 
 55.  Ian Ward, International Order, Political Community, and the Search for a European 
Public Philosophy, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 930, 934 (discussing “the idea of group iden-
tity and the sense of reciprocal obligations between community and citizen”).  
 56.  Id. at 935 (“[T]he sense of affinity that every community needs is established by the 
inculcation of certain citizenship responsibilities. A sense of belonging comes from a 
nurtured sense of participation.”). 
 57.  Id.; see also Jürgen Habermas, Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on 
the Future of Europe, 12 PRAXIS INT’L 1, 5 (1992) (arguing that citizenship’s “definition 
of membership serves, along with the territorial demarcation of the country’s borders, 
the purpose of a social delimitation of the state”). 
 58.  See Kostakopoulou, infra note 78, at 633. 
 59.  See T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and the Social Class, THE WELFARE STATE READER 30, 
30 (Christopher Pierson and Francis Geoffrey eds. 2006) (“I propose to divide citizen-
ship into three parts . . . civil, political and social.”).  
 60.  Id. at 31 (“In the economic field the basic civil right is the right to work, that is to say 
the right to follow the occupation of one’s choice in the place of one’s choice, subject 
only legitimate demands for preliminary technical training.”).  
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. (“The story of civil rights in their formative period is one of the gradual addition of 
new rights.”).  
 63.  Id. (noting the end of slave status in England and the grant of citizenship to peasants).  
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political rights, such as the right to vote and stand in elections; these 
were seen as protecting sections of the population that had traditionally 
wielded little political power.64 These political rights started as eco-
nomic in scope (the privilege of a limited economic class) and sub-
stance (including, for example, participation in trade associations).65 
They too became universal, personal rights as suffrage for women and 
non-landowners came into being.66 
Social rights were the last of the elements of citizenship to de-
velop, connected to a growing consciousness that the removal of bar-
riers to political and economic participation was insufficient to combat 
growing social inequality.67 Proponents demanded rights “to a certain 
standard of civilization . . . conditional only on the discharge of the 
general duties of citizenship.”68 These rights did not depend on the 
claimant’s economic status, and were thus by nature universal.69 Their 
rise coincided with that of the welfare state providing basic social ser-
vices to all citizens.70As a result of the social rights framework, citi-
zenship began to mean more than mere freedom to pursue economic 
activities without interference.71 It took an egalitarian turn, seeking to 
prevent the most extreme forms of inequality and abject poverty.72 Ul-
timately, the affording of basic social welfare became part of the ex-
change between citizens and the state.73 
 
 64.  Id. at 32.  
 65.  Id. (stating that in the nineteenth century, “the political franchise . . . was the privilege 
of a limited economic class”). 
 66.  Id. (arguing that the twentieth century abandoned the economic view of political rights, 
“attach[ing] political rights directly and independently to citizenship as such”).  
 67.  Id. at 35 (describing “a growing interest in equality as a principle of social justice and 
an appreciation of the fact that the formal recognition of an equal capacity for rights was 
not enough” and noting that “even the complete removal of all the barriers that separated 
civil rights from their remedies would not have interfered with the principles of the class 
structure of the capitalist system”). 
 68.  Id. at 36.  
 69.  Id. (“There is therefore a significant difference between a genuine collective bargain 
through which economic forces in a free market seek to achieve equilibrium and the use 
of collective civil rights to assert basic claims to the elements of social justice.”).  
 70.  Id. at 37-38.  
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. at 38-39 (stating that “the preservation of economic inequalities has been made more 
difficult by the enrichment of the status of citizenship”). 
 73.  MICHAEL BOMMES & ANDREW GEDDES, IMMIGRATION AND WELFARE: CHALLENGING 
THE BORDERS OF THE WELFARE STATE 1 (2d ed. 2005) (“The sovereignty of nation states 
over a given territory and population was and still is based on the exchange of the polit-
ical provision of welfare in exchange for the internal loyalty of their citizens. If loyalty 
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The development of the social model of citizenship and the mod-
ern welfare state carried with it one dark undercurrent: immigration 
control.74 Immigrants were viewed as a threat to the welfare state, and 
were categorized and granted limited rights according to their ability 
to produce economic benefits for the host state.75 Undocumented, guest 
worker, asylum seeker, family migrant, etc., these categories were used 
to define, among other rights, immigrants’ access to the welfare state.76 
Immigration’s challenge to the welfare state is both practical and con-
ceptual, practical in that it demands allocation of theoretically scarce 
resources, and conceptual as it requires drawing lines on access to the 
benefits of citizenship.77 
In the early 1990s, scholars generally viewed European citizen-
ship as merely symbolic, adding little to the pre-Maastricht framework 
for the free movement of workers.78 Article 21 of the TFEU stated that 
“[e]very citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside 
freely within the territory of the Member States, subject to the limita-
tions and conditions laid down in this Treaty and by the measures 
adopted to give it effect.”79 But Union citizenship was seen as lacking 
social content as it was premised on economic justifications designed 
to promote market integration; thus, it was simply the “mirror image” 
 
is one side of the coin, then the other side is external closure at the borders of nation 
states.”) (emphasis original).  
 74.  Id. (describing closed borders as the “other side of the coin” of the welfare state); see 
also Menéndez, supra note 10 at 4 n. 10 (stating that “the emergence of national welfare 
. . . required a stronger distinction between nationals (or permanent foreign residents) 
and foreigners, if only to ensure that eligibility conditions were respected”).   
 75.  MICHAEL BOMMES & ANDREW GEDDES, IMMIGRATION AND WELFARE: CHALLENGING 
THE BORDERS OF THE WELFARE STATE, 2 (2d ed. 2005).  
 76.  Id. (“These filters exclude certain forms of unwanted migration, define a variety of legal 
conditions for immigration and residence, combine them with different welfare entitle-
ments and, consequently, pave the social options for those who enter the country.”). See 
also Ryner, supra note 29, at 52 (noting how these categories subject migrants to “dis-
cretionary state power and discrimination in selective means-tested welfare regimes”).  
 77.  See BOMMES & GEDDES, supra note 73; See also Ryner, supra note 29, at 52 (noting 
how these categories subject migrants to “discretionary state power and discrimination 
in selective means-tested welfare regimes”).  
 78.  See Dora Kostakopoulou, European Union Citizenship: Writing the Future, 13(5) EUR. 
L. J. 623, 624-25 (2007) (showing how early on, the transformative potential of Union 
citizenship “remained at the margins of the debate” over the treaty).  
 79.  Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 18(1), 
Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33 [hereinafter ECT].  
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of pre-Maastricht mercantile citizenship.80 It also lacked the sense of 
belonging among citizens that generally accompanies national citizen-
ship.81 Finally, because Union citizenship depended on being a citizen 
of a member state, it remained the prerogative of the member states to 
act as gatekeepers in determining who would access the benefits of 
Union citizenship.82 Article 20 of the TFEU supported this narrow con-
ceptual view, stating that Union citizenship would be “additional to,” 
and not replace, national citizenship.83 
In subsequent years, a second perspective emerged, one that rec-
ognized the transformative possibility of Union citizenship and the 
possibility for incremental change that would make the EU more so-
cial.84 Constructivist scholars argued that the boundaries of political 
community are constructed by states and individuals themselves rather 
than inevitably tied to national identity.85 Therefore, Union citizenship 
could deemphasize nationalism’s role in defining political community 
as social integration fosters a cosmopolitan orientation towards Union 
citizens from different member states.86 Constructivist scholars argued 
in favor of disconnecting political community from nationality in 
 
 80.  Kostakopoulou, supra note 78, at 625 (“European citizenship appeared to comprise a 
core of economic entitlements primarily designed to facilitate market integration . . . it 
reflected a loose and fragmented form of mercantile citizenship.”); see generally J. 
d’Oliveira, Union Citizenship: Pie in the Sky?, in A CITIZENS’ EUROPE: IN SEARCH OF A 
NEW ORDER (A. Rosas and E. Antola eds. 1995). 
 81.  Kostakopoulou, supra note 78 (noting that Union citizenship was seen as having a 
“weak affective dimension”). See also Habermas, supra note 57, at 7 (“[D]emocratic 
processes have hitherto only functioned within national borders. So far, the political 
sphere is fragmented into national units. The question thus arises whether there can ever 
be such a thing as European citizenship . . . the consciousness of ‘an obligation toward 
the European commonwealth.’”).  
 82.  Kostakopoulou, supra note 78, at 626 (“Making European citizenship a derivative of 
national citizenship does not only give prominence to the nationality principle, but, per-
haps more worryingly, subjects membership to the European public to the definitions, 
terms and conditions of membership prevailing in national publics.”). 
 83.  TFEU art. 20. 
 84.  Kostakopoulou, supra note 78 (“A rival, constructivist perspective did not hesitate to 
view European citizenship as a marker of a wider socio-political transformation.”). Con-
structivism stands in opposition to essentialism, which would consider citizenship and 
political community essentially static. 
 85.  Kostakopoulou, supra note 78, at 627-28.  
 86.  Id. (“European integration has turned Europeans into Union citizens and has fostered a 
cosmopolitan orientation of openness towards the ‘other.’”). 
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defining citizenship, thereby recasting one of the weaknesses of Union 
citizenship as its major strength.87 
Union citizenship was an experiment, creating a new, cosmopoli-
tan political community resistant to the pernicious influence of nation-
alism.88 Cosmopolitan citizens of the EU would feel affinity and an 
obligation of care for all of their fellow citizens regardless of member 
state of origin.89 The result of this incremental process is “a political 
order that transcends the Nation State” a new, European social iden-
tity.90 European supranational citizenship also raised the possibility of 
universal global citizenship and a truly transnational political commu-
nity.91 
The Citizenship Cases 
Expanding the Scope of Citizenship Rights 
In a series of cases, the ECJ expanded the scope of citizenship 
rights by giving teeth to the concept of non-discrimination and relaxing 
the requirement that a citizen engage in economic activity or freedom 
of movement before invoking these rights. Article 21 of the TFEU 
states that “[e]very citizen of the Union shall have the right to move 
and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, subject to 
the limitations and conditions laid down in this Treaty and by the 
measures adopted to give it effect.”92 
María Martínez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern explored the extent to 
which welfare benefits could be tied to residency and national status 
under this prohibition of member state discrimination against non-
 
 87.  Id. (stating that the constructivist perspective “was associated with a renewed focus on 
longstanding concerns about the maintenance of nationality as a proxy for defining po-
litical community . . . and the effects of the replacement of the ideal of national homo-
geneity with multiplicity and diversity”). 
 88.  Id.  (“Europe could thus become the setting for the more ambitious transition to a post 
national tableau and the prototype for cosmopolitan experimentation on a global 
scale.”). 
 89.  Kostakopoulou, supra note 78, at 629 (“[C]osmopolitanism unties the citizen from the 
bounds of a particular polity.”). In its most extreme form, cosmopolitanism entails ob-
ligations between an individual and all other persons in the world.  
 90.  Id.  
 91.  See Habermas, supra note 57, at 19 (stating that as a result of early efforts at European 
unification, “[t]he arrival of world citizenship is no longer merely a phantom”).  
 92.  Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 18(1), 
Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33 [hereinafter ECT].  
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nationals.93 Martinez Sala was a Spanish national residing in Germany 
who was denied a child-raising allowance because she was unable to 
produce a residence permit, despite the fact that she had been living in 
Germany for many years.94 The ECJ ruled that Germany’s residence 
permit requirement constituted a violation of the principle of non-dis-
crimination on the basis of national origin.95 The Court noted that Ger-
man nationals were not required to produce a residence permit in order 
to obtain the child-raising allowance, so requiring it of Ms. Sala con-
stituted unequal treatment.96 
Moreover, the permit was not necessary to establish whether Ms. 
Sala had the right to reside in Germany because she was an EU citizen, 
and thus entitled to receive the child-raising allowance so long as she 
met the requirements that the German government imposed on Ger-
mans.97 The decision thereby gave teeth to the non-discrimination prin-
ciples in EU law, but left undecided the full extent of the right to move 
and reside freely within the territory of the member states.98 It was no-
table as the first time the Court relied directly on the citizenship provi-
sions in granting social rights to a Union citizen.99 
In Baumbast and R.,100 the Court addressed whether Article 21 
grants a right of residency for non-nationals in a member state.101 
 
 93.  Case C-85/96, María Martínez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern, 1998 E.C.R. I-02691 ¶ 1. 
 94.  Id. at ¶¶ 13, 17.  
 95.  Id. at ¶ 54.  
 96.  Id. (“[F]or a Member State to require a national of another Member State who wishes 
to receive a benefit such as the allowance in question to produce a document . . . when 
its own nationals are not required to produce any document of that kind, amounts to 
unequal treatment.”).  
 97.  Id. at ¶ 65 (holding that Community law precludes member states from “requiring na-
tionals of other Member States authorised to reside in its territory to produce a formal 
residence permit issued by the national authorities in order to receive a child-raising 
allowance, whereas that Member State’s own nationals are only required to be perma-
nently or ordinarily resident in that Member State”).  
 98.  See id. at ¶ 60 (stating that “it is not necessary to examine whether the person concerned 
can rely on Article 8a of the Treaty in order to obtain recognition of a new right to reside 
in the territory of the Member State concerned”). The Court thus suggested that a right 
of residence could be found under direct application of the non-discrimination language 
in Article 8a [later 18(1) ECT]. Id. 
 99.  See Wind, supra note 4, at 256 (“The 1998 Martínez Sala ruling was the first case in 
which the Court relied directly on the citizenship provisions.”).  
 100.  Case C-413/99, Baumbast and R. v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, 2002 E.C.R. I-
7091.  
 101.  Id. at ¶ 76 (“[T]he national tribunal seeks essentially to ascertain whether a citizen of 
the European Union who no longer enjoys a right of residence as a migrant worker in 
 
_HERBET_FINAL 10-26 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/26/2018  11:38 AM 
2018  University of Baltimore School of Law 
70 
Specifically, Baumbast – a German national – argued that “the right to 
move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States” 
meant that he could establish residency in the United Kingdom despite 
the fact that he was employed outside the UK.102 The Commission, UK, 
and German governments all argued that the Article did not have direct 
effect as against the member states and was subject to pre-existing lim-
itations from prior to the treaty’s adoption, specifically the link be-
tween the right of residence and economic activity or sufficient re-
sources.103 
The Court rejected this argument, holding that as a national of a 
member state, and thus a Union citizen, Baumbast had the right to di-
rectly rely on Article 21 even in the absence of national implementing 
legislation.104 While the TFEU provides for some limitations to the 
right of residence emanating from Union citizenship, including that the 
migrant citizen have sufficient resources to avoid becoming a burden 
on the state, the application of those limitations is subject to a propor-
tionality inquiry.105 
With respect to Mr. Baumbast, the ECJ held that denying him the 
right to reside in the UK violated Article 21 under the principle of pro-
portionality.106 Baumbast had sufficient resources to reside in the UK, 
had lawfully resided there for a number of years with his family as an 
employed and self-employed person, and did not become a burden on 
the public finances of the UK.107 Given these facts, the Court found 
that denying Baumbast and his family the right to reside in the UK 
constituted a “disproportionate interference” with the exercise of the 
right of residence. In other words, the question of where Mr. Baumbast 
 
the host Member State can, as a citizen of the European Union, enjoy there a right of 
residence by direct application of Article 18(1) EC.”). 
 102.  Id. at ¶¶ 76-77 (“According to Mr. Baumbast . . . [Article 18] should be interpreted to 
mean that [he] continues to exercise a right of residence in the United Kingdom while 
he is working outside the European Union.”).  
 103.  Id. at ¶¶ 78-79.  
 104.  Id. at ¶ 84 (“Purely as a national of a Member State, and consequently a citizen of the 
Union, Mr. Baumbast therefore has the right to rely on Article 18(1) EC.”). 
 105.  Id. at ¶ 91 (stating that “those limitations and conditions must be applied in compliance 
with the limits imposed by Community law and in accordance with the general princi-
ples of that law, in particular the principle of proportionality”).  
 106.  Id. at ¶¶ 91-92 (reciting that proportionality requires “that national measures adopted 
on [the] subject must be necessary and appropriate to attain the objective pursued” and 
holding that denying Baumbast residence rights would violate proportionality).  
 107.  Id. at ¶ 92.  
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was employed was irrelevant; he and his family had the right to reside 
in the UK under Article 21 alone.108 The ruling stands for the principle 
that a citizen of the EU can exercise the right to reside in any member 
state by direct application of Article 21 of the TFEU without engaging 
in economic activity via employment.109 Baumbast thereby expanded 
the scope of European citizenship beyond non-discrimination and cre-
ated a general right of residence for all EU citizens.110 
In addition to the general right of residence derived from Article 
21, the ECJ has found the provision to also protect citizens from dis-
criminatory treatment at the hands of their member state of origin when 
the member state imposes burdens on the exercise of one of the funda-
mental freedoms guaranteed by Union citizenship.111 In D’Hoop v. Of-
fice National de L’Emploi, a Belgian student was denied a tideover 
allowance upon graduation because she had completed her secondary 
education in France.112 Belgium granted the allowance to young unem-
ployed people immediately after graduation, but only if they completed 
their secondary education in Belgium; however, the rules permitted the 
children of migrant workers living Belgium to complete their second-
ary education in another member state.113 Thus, the children of migrant 
workers were free to travel outside Belgium for their education and 
receive the allowance, while Belgian nationals had to remain in the 
state to be eligible.114 
The ECJ considered whether this constituted discrimination 
against Belgian nationals by placing a barrier that did not exist for non-
 
 108.  See id. at ¶ 81 (noting that while previously “the Court had held that that right of resi-
dence, conferred directly by the EC Treaty, was subject to the condition that the person 
concerned was carrying on an economic activity,” ECT Article 18(1) “conferred a right, 
for every citizen, to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States”). 
 109.  Id. at ¶ 94 (“[A] citizen of the European Union who no longer enjoys a right of residence 
as a migrant worker in the host Member State can, as a citizen of the Union, enjoy there 
a right of residence by direct application of Article 18(1) EC.”). 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Case C-224/98, D’Hoop v. Office National de L’Emploi, 2002 E.C.R. I-06191 ¶¶ 29-
33. 
 112.  Id. at ¶ 23.  
 113.  Id. at ¶¶ 6-7. A previous judgment from the Court held that requiring everyone to com-
plete their secondary education in Belgium in order to receive the allowance discrimi-
nated against non-nationals, so Belgium amended the legislation to waive the require-
ment for the dependent children of migrant workers residing in Belgium. See Case C-
278/94, Commission v. Belgium, 1996 E.C.R. I-4307.  
 114.  Id. 
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nationals on their freedom to pursue education outside Belgium.115 The 
Court ruled that the legislation violated D’Hoop’s “freedom to move 
and reside within the territory of the Member States.”116 It held that 
legislation erecting barriers to the freedom of movement to pursue ed-
ucation in another member state are subject to a proportionality inquiry 
when they discriminate against nationals of the member state.117 
Turning directly to the issue of proportionality, the Court found 
that the means of withholding the allowance from nationals who con-
ducted their secondary education outside the state were disproportion-
ate to the legitimate end pursued, ensuring the subsidy went to gradu-
ates seeking work in Belgium.118 The court first noted that the Belgian 
government had not raised any defense of the law on this basis, then 
found that the law was both “too general and exclusive” to be consid-
ered proportionate to Belgium’s legitimate aims.119 Specifically, the 
Court noted that the place where a student conducts their secondary 
education does not necessarily determine where they ultimately work, 
and Belgium’s choice to zero in on this element to the exclusion of all 
others in determining eligibility for the benefit could not be justified in 
relation to the public policy aim cited in justifying the condition.120 
Thus, the legislation created a disproportionate barrier to Belgians’ ex-
ercise of the freedom to move abroad and pursue secondary educa-
tion.121 
The D’Hoop decision demonstrates how the concept of EU citi-
zenship expanded the scope of the freedom of movement to cover per-
sons, rather than just workers.122 It also provides an example of EU 
 
 115.  Id. at ¶ 30. 
 116.  Id. at ¶ 29. 
 117.  Id. at ¶ 36 (stating that “[t]he condition at issue could be justified only if it were based 
on objective considerations independent of the nationality of the persons concerned and 
were proportionate to the legitimate aim of the national provisions”).  
 118.  Id. at ¶¶ 38-39 (“[I]t is legitimate for the national legislature to wish to ensure that there 
is a real link between the applicant for that allowance and the geographic employment 
market concerned.”).  
 119.  Id. at ¶ 37 (noting that “[n]either the Belgian Government nor ONEM has submitted 
any observations on [proportionality]”)  
 120.  Id. (holding that the Belgian scheme “unduly favours an element which is not neces-
sarily representative of the real and effective degree of connection between the applicant 
for the tideover allowance and the geographic employment market, to the exclusion of 
all other representative elements.”). 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id. at ¶ 35 (noting that D’Hoop’s rights emanated from her status as a citizen of the 
Union). D’Hoop was not a worker at the time she sought the tideover allowance, but 
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citizenship providing new substantive rights to a citizen as against her 
own state when national legislation infringes on the freedom of move-
ment in a manner that disproportionately affects nationals relative to 
non-nationals.123 As a result of D’Hoop, member states cannot punish 
their own nationals for exercising the freedom to move when allocating 
welfare benefits.124 
Member states may require a reasonable period of residence in 
order to establish an EU citizen migrant’s bona fide ties to the state and 
intent to remain prior to distributing welfare.125 In Collins v. Secretary 
of State for Work and Pensions, an Irish worker was denied a 
jobseeker’s allowance in the United Kingdom because he had not ha-
bitually resided there prior to applying for the benefit, and was not a 
worker.126 First, the ECJ ruled that the principle of equal treatment of 
EU citizens requires nondiscrimination in the allocation of “benefit[s] 
of a financial nature intended to facilitate access to employment in the 
labour market.”127 Thus, while it was legitimate for the UK to require 
a period of residence prior to providing unemployment in order to pre-
vent “benefit tourism,” the measure needed to be justified under the 
principle of proportionality.128 Residence requirements therefore can-
not go beyond what is necessary to ensure a connection between the 
person seeking the benefit and the labor market of the member state.129 
Finally, the Court emphasized that the application of such statutes 
must “rest on clear criteria known in advance,” with the possibility for 
judicial review, and cannot depend on the nationality of the individual 
seeking social assistance.130 Similarly, in De Cuyper v. Office National 
de L’emploi, the ECJ ruled that a Belgian national who moved to 
France after claiming unemployment benefits could be denied by the 
Belgian authorities on the basis that he was no longer a resident. While 
 
was seeking her first employment; regardless, the question of whether she was a worker 
was irrelevant to the Court’s decision. Id. at ¶ 40.  
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Case C-138/02, Collins v. Sec’y of State for Work and Pensions, 2004 E.C.R. I-02703 
¶ 65. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. at ¶ 63.  
 128.  Id. at ¶¶ 50, 69 (“It may be regarded as legitimate for a Member State to grant such an 
allowance only after it has been possible to establish that a genuine link exists between 
the person seeking work and the employment market of that State.”)  
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Id. 
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this constitutes an infringement of Article 21, the breach is justified in 
light of the public interest in being able to determine the continuing 
eligibility of the claimant. Thus, it is justified under the principle of 
proportionality. 
In Trojani v. Centre Public d’aideSociale de Bruxelles, another 
case involving student entitlements, the ECJ held that a non-national 
in a member state with a valid residence permit had the right to receive 
a minimum allowance provided to citizens of the host state under the 
fundamental principle of equal treatment as laid down in Article 18 of 
the TFEU.131 Some member states may require that non-nationals 
prove that they will not place a burden on public assistance as a condi-
tion of residency. The principle of non-discrimination means that 
member states cannot withhold assistance from valid residents who 
originate from another member state regardless of their employment 
status.132 Thus, when a citizen has been lawfully resident in a host state 
for a certain period of time or possesses a residence permit, the host 
state cannot treat them differently from national citizens.133 
While the requirement that a person will not become a burden on 
the state’s public assistance is relevant to residency rights, non-na-
tional residents cannot be treated any differently from national citizens 
when a member state allocates welfare.134 In other words, once a non-
national establishes residency in the host state, they are entitled to the 
same public assistance benefits as a national citizen regardless of 
whether there is economic productivity.135 The limitations to Article 18 
may seemingly protect member states from the burdens of providing 
welfare to non-nationals on the basis of their EU citizenship. In reality, 
 
 131.  Case C-456/02, Trojani v. Centre Public d’aide Sociale de Bruxelles, 2004 E.C.R. I-
07573 ¶ 44.  
 132.  Id. (“[N]ational legislation . . . in so far as it does not grant the social assistance benefit 
to citizens of the European Union, non-nationals of the Member State, who reside there 
lawfully even though they satisfy the conditions required of nationals of that Member 
State, constitutes discrimination on grounds of nationality.”). 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Id. at ¶ 40 (stating that “while the Member States may make residence of a citizen of 
the Union who is not economically active conditional on his having sufficient resources, 
that does not mean that such a person cannot, during his lawful residence in the host 
Member State, benefit from the fundamental principle of equal treatment as laid down 
in Article 12 EC”).  
 135.  Id. at ¶ 43 (“[W]ith regard to such benefits, a citizen of the Union who is not economi-
cally active may rely on Article 12 EC where he has been lawfully resident in the host 
Member State for a certain time or possesses a residence permit.”). 
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however, a member state may only object to providing residency to 
such individuals once it is established that the member state must pro-
vide the non-citizen resident with all the same benefits it would pro-
vide to its own citizens.136 The holding in Trojani represents a very 
narrow interpretation of the exceptions to Article 18 and an expansive 
interpretation of the rights afforded by EU citizenship in the welfare 
context.137 
Under certain circumstances, a member state national may gain 
the protection of EU citizenship rights even absent any exercise of the 
freedom of movement.138 In Zambrano v. Office National de L’emploi, 
the ECJ ruled that two children residing as citizens in Belgium had a 
valid claim under EU law that the deportation of their third-country 
national (TCN) parents violated their right of residence and free move-
ment.139 First, the Court explicitly noted that Directive 2004/38 (the 
residence directive) did not apply to the claimants because they had 
not moved to or resided in a member state other than that of their na-
tional origin.140 Next, the Court reiterated that the children had the 
“fundamental status” of Union citizenship under Article 20, and were 
therefore protected against state measures that interfered with the 
“genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by their 
status as citizens of the Union.”141 Refusing to grant a right of residence 
to the parents would force the children to leave the territory of the EU 
– a result incompatible with their status as Union citizens.142 Thus, EU 
law protects TCNs from deportation when they have dependent chil-
dren who are Union citizens.143 
 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id.; see also Wind, supra note 4, at 261 (explaining that in Trojani, as in Grzelczk, “the 
equal treatment principles seem to completely overrule the restrictions and limitations 
put down in the Treaty and in secondary legislation, the purpose of which was to protect 
the Member States from having to share their welfare with nationals from other Member 
States”).  
 138.  See Case C-34/09, Zambrano v. Office National de L’emploi, 2011 E.C.R. I-01177 ¶ 
38-39.  
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Id. at 39.  
 141.  Id. at 42. 
 142.  Id. at 44 (“It must be assumed that such a refusal would lead to a situation where those 
children, citizens of the Union, would have to leave the territory of the Union in order 
to accompany their parents.”).  
 143.  Id. 
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In the proceedings before the Court in Zambrano, the member 
states and Commission argued in favor of constructing the situation as 
“purely internal” to the affairs of Belgium, and therefore outside the 
scope of EU law.144 The Court rejected this argument based on a func-
tional understanding of the exercise of the rights comprising Union cit-
izenship. The holding invalidated any member state action which has 
the effect of depriving citizens of the substantive rights of citizen-
ship.145 Notably, the Court’s decision relied on Article 20, the citizen-
ship provision, rather than Article 21 granting freedom of move-
ment.146 The Court’s ruling thereby recognized a penumbra of rights 
guaranteed by Union citizenship despite the lack of explicit language 
to that effect in the TFEU.147 
In McCarthy v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, the 
ECJ distinguished the treatment of TCN spouses of EU citizens from 
that of TCN parents of EU citizens.148 The Court ruled that McCarthy, 
an adult EU citizen, could not bring a claim under Article 20 or Article 
21 to seek a right of residence for her Jamaican husband.149 Contrasting 
the situation with that in Zambrano, the Court found that the claimant 
would not be deprived of the genuine enjoyment of her EU rights if her 
husband was not allowed to reside in the member state where he was 
seeking residence.150 Unlike Zambrano, the denial of the claimant’s 
husband’s residence application would not practically result in her 
leaving the territory of the EU.151 Because the claimant was seeking 
rights in her nation of origin, rather than a different member state, she 
could not rely directly on the citizenship provisions or Directive 
2004/38 to claim that denying her husband residence would interfere 
 
 144.  Opinion of the Advocate General, Case C-34/09, Zambrano v. Office National de L’em-
ploi, 2011 E.C.R. I-01177 ¶ 91.  
 145.  See Zambrano, decision of the Court, at ¶ 42-44.  
 146.  Id. 
 147.  See Eleftheriadis, infra note 208, at 780 (“Consequently, citizenship does not merely 
entail the protection of some rights by the enforcement of the correlative duties but, in 
addition, it protects the ‘exercise’ of the ‘substance’ of those rights.”).  
 148.  Case C-434/09, McCarthy v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, 2011 E.C.R. I-03375 
¶¶ 53-54. 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Id. at ¶ 50 (“In that regard, by contrast with the case of Ruiz Zambrano, the national 
measure at issue in the main proceedings in the present case does not have the effect of 
obliging Mrs McCarthy to leave the territory of the European Union.”). 
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with her freedom of movement.152 Hence, EU law did not provide a 
remedy for the claimed deprivation of her rights.153 
McCarthy demonstrates one of the conceptual challenges in ap-
plying the social rights of European citizens. These rights are most ef-
fective when the citizen abandons their member state of origin.154 Ar-
ticle 21 would have governed the denial of McCarthy’s husband if she 
were moving with him to a member state other than that of her origin.155 
The Court’s decision to apply the penumbra of rights framework in 
Zambrano, but not McCarthy, stemmed from a recognition that the cit-
izen children of TCNs are particularly vulnerable to adverse immigra-
tion decisions which result in expulsion from the EU.156 
In addition, “bona fide” national citizens with foreign spouses will 
likely receive better treatment from national governments in compari-
son to nominal national citizens who will likely be discriminated 
against on the basis of their parents’ nationality.157 Still, unresolved 
tension exists between the universal framing of the Zambrano decision 
and the Court’s reticence to abandon the requirement that a citizen ex-
ercises the freedom of movement prior to invoking the rights of EU 
citizenship.158 
The Impact of the ECJ Citizenship Cases 
Collectively, these cases represent a significant expansion of the 
rights comprising European Union citizenship, especially for non-
workers and students.159 The citizenship cases also demonstrate that 
 
 152.  Id. at ¶ 54 (noting that despite being a dual citizen of both the UK and Ireland, the 
claimant had not exercised freedom of movement such as to invoke Article 21 TFEU).  
 153.  Id. 
 154.  Eeftheriadis, infra note 208, at 782 (identifying the paradox that “a citizen can enjoy 
EU rights of citizenship only if they abandon the state of their citizenship”).  
 155.  See Baumbast at ¶¶ 91-92.  
 156.  McCarthy at ¶ 50.  
 157.  The rhetoric surrounding “anchor babies” in the United States provides an example of 
this type of discrimination against children who are, legally speaking, citizens. See Rena 
Flores, Donald Trump: “Anchor Babies” Aren’t American Citizens, CBS NEWS (Aug. 
19, 2015), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/donald-trump-anchor-babies-arent-ameri-
can-citizens.  
 158.  See Eleftheriadis, infra note 208, at 782-83 (framing the issue as one of the “paradoxes 
of EU citizenship”).  
 159.  See Wind, supra note 4, at 259 (“With the development of the Court’s case law, it ap-
pears as though the originally strict distinction between the rights of workers and non-
workers in the EU is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish”). 
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the Court’s view of Union citizenship sharply contrasts with that of the 
member states.160 In each of the cases, the member state challenging 
the non-national’s right to the social allowance sought to uphold the 
distinction between economically-active and economically-inactive 
migrants.161 The Court continuously rejected this argument, interpret-
ing the TFEU provisions broadly and advancing a vision of Union cit-
izenship with very limited member state interference proportionate to 
the aim of preventing fraud.162 The Court gradually weakened the prin-
ciple that citizenship rights only vest upon the exercise of the freedom 
of movement by recognizing member state discrimination against its 
own citizens exercising the freedom, as well as actions interfering with 
the substance of its enjoyment.163 
The series of cases on EU citizenship and welfare directly influ-
enced the drafting of Directive 2004/38/EC, which grants Union citi-
zens the right to permanent residence after spending five years in a host 
state, and provides for numerous conditions on the regulation of resi-
dency by Union citizens.164 Directive 2004/38/EC eliminated the resi-
dence permit obligation for EU citizens residing in member states, lim-
ited administrative discretion to expel such citizens, and provided for 
automatic permanent residence status once a person has resided in a 
member state for a continuous period of five years.165 An EU citizen 
exercising the freedom of movement can rely on the directive in the 
 
 160.  Wind, supra note 4, at 262 (“[T]he Court . . . is already so far ahead in the creation of 
a true social citizenship encompassing all Union citizens irrespective of their EU nation-
ality that the two bodies—the Court and Member States—seem to be heading in com-
pletely opposite directions.”). 
 161.  Wind, supra note 4, at 262. 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  See D’Hoop at ¶ 38-40; Zambrano at ¶ 42-44; see also Síofra O’Leary, The Past, Pre-
sent and Future of the Purely Internal Rule in EU Law, 44 IRISH JUR. 13, 45 (2012) (“Is 
the enjoyment of the status of Union citizenship . . . contingent on free movement and 
the existence of a cross-border element? The answer to this broad question would, as 
the Court has now indicated in Rottmann, Ruiz Zambrano and McCarthy, have to be 
no.”). 
 164.  Síofra O’Leary, The Past, Present and Future of the Purely Internal Rule in EU Law, 
44 Irish Jur. 13, 45 (2012) at 261-62 (stating that “[i]n at least some respects, the Mem-
ber State governments went quite far in accepting the Court’s previous case law” in 
adopting the directive and quoting language from the directive that echoes the Court’s 
decision in Trojani); Council Directive 2004/38/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 158) 77 (EC). 
 165.  Directive 2004/38/EC at 94-95; Directive 2004/58/EC at ¶ 16. 
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national courts of the state to which they are migrating, or failing that, 
the ECJ.166 
On the issue of expelling Union citizens, the directive states that 
beneficiaries of the right of residence should not be expelled so long 
as they do not become an “unreasonable burden” on the welfare of the 
host state and that expulsion should not be an automatic result of rely-
ing on social assistance.167 In defining “unreasonable burden,” it directs 
the member state to consider whether the non-national is experiencing 
temporary difficulties and take into account the duration of residence, 
personal circumstances, and amount of aid granted to the benefi-
ciary.168 The result is that it is difficult for a member state to show that 
an individual has placed an unreasonable burden on social assistance 
so as to justify withholding residence rights in a particular case.169 This 
has led to the criticism that the directive is unhelpfully vague.170 Still, 
the unreasonable burden requirement protects against capricious mem-
ber state interpretations of the limitations placed on the right of resi-
dence enjoyed by EU citizens as the directive is continually imple-
mented.171 
EU law thus gives the ECJ a very large role in making welfare 
policy for the member states, especially as it relates to questions of 
eligibility for non-nationals.172 This supplants a core area of state sov-
ereignty, namely the power to define who has access to the benefits 
 
 166.  Directive 2004/38/EC at 94-95. 
 167.  Id. at 82.   
 168.  Id. 
 169.  See Case C-258/04, Office National de L’Emploi v. Ioannidis, 2005 E.C.R. I-8275; Case 
C-192/05, Tas-Hagen v. Raadskamer WUBO van de Pensioen-en Uitkeringsraad, 2006 
E.C.R. I-1045; and Case C-406/04, De Cuyper v. ONEM, 2006 E.C.R. I-10451; see also 
Kay Hailbronner, Union Citizenship and Access to Social Benefits, 42 COMMON MKT. 
L. REV. 1245, 1261 (stating that an unreasonable burden under the directive will be “dif-
ficult to show” and that “[i]n a particular case it will hardly ever be possible”).  
 170.  See Kay Hailbronner, Union Citizenship and Access to Social Benefits, 42 COMMON 
MKT. L. REV. 1245, 1262 (“As general rules, they are at best useless if not harmful. 
There are no criteria whatsoever to decide whether an individual may ever become an 
unreasonable burden on the social system. Every dependence on a social system in-
creases the burden.”).  
 171.  Id. (offering that the rules “perhaps make some sense in the particular context they were 
used as a basis for checking the legislative implementation of a Directive by the Member 
States”). 
 172.  See Wind, supra note 4, at 263 (“[S]ince the majority of secondary legislation in this 
area is based on a codification of the ECJ case law, the Member States appear to have 
accepted that in supranational entities where compromises and creativity are in constant 
demand, courts are deemed to play a significant role in policy making.”). 
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provided by participation in the political community.173 Welfare eligi-
bility is central to defining the ties of solidarity that bind citizens to 
each other and to the nation.174 As a result of EU citizenship law, the 
issue of who is entitled to the rewards of citizenship is no longer the 
sole province of the member states participating in the Union.175 This 
constitutes a de-nationalization of welfare in the EU.176 
Each of the citizenship cases asked the question of whether the 
claimant was entitled to share in the benefits of the national political 
community. In Westphalian Europe, the answer to this question de-
pended on the nationality of the claimant. Under the EC framework, 
the answer depended on whether the claimant economically contrib-
uted to the welfare of the member state.177 Under a truly cosmopolitan 
framework, aid would be given out to Union citizens on the basis of 
their inherent worth. Presently, the state of the law is somewhere be-
tween the second and third perspectives, but for scholars considering 
the arc of the Court’s jurisprudence it is easy to imagine that things are 
moving in a cosmopolitan direction. 
The decisions in Sala and its progeny were based on a construc-
tivist reading of Union citizenship.178 The Court expansively inter-
preted the language of the citizenship provisions, providing them with 
new, independent legal meaning.179 Thus, the issue of Union citizen-
ship demonstrates how delegating enforcement of abstract treaty prin-
ciples to a supranational court leads inexorably to the creation of new 
 
 173.  See Wind, supra note 4, at 263; see also Hailbronner, supra note 170, at 1265 (noting 
that “[h]istorically, welfare systems were constructed as part of a general process of 
State building . . . closely connected to the development of the nation State”).  
 174.  See Hailbronner, supra note 170, at 1265. 
 175.  Hailbronner, supra note 170, at 1265; Wind, supra note 4, at 263. 
 176.  See Martinsen, supra note 8, at 110 (arguing that “de-nationalization of welfare in the 
EU has largely been achieved”).  
 177.  See Kostakopoulou, supra note 78, at 625 (discussing the EC model of “mercantile 
citizenship”).  
 178.  See Kostakopoulou, supra note 78, at 635 (“The ECJ did not hesitate to embark upon a 
constructivist reading of Union citizenship. In Martinez Sala, the ECJ held that lawful 
residence of a Community national in another Member State is sufficient to bring her 
within the scope of ratione personae of [the citizenship treaties].”).  
 179.  Id. (stating that “the court displayed its capacity to attach a new constructive meaning 
to the status of citizenship of the Union, thereby overriding the interests of Member 
States.”). 
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legal rights and deeper social relations among member states.180 The 
ECJ has continually interpreted Article 21 of the TFEU in an expansive 
way, bringing new welfare issues under the umbrella of non-discrimi-
nation based on national origin.181 This process of dynamic interpreta-
tion represents more than simply tinkering at the margins of EU law, 
but rather, constitutes a fundamental preconception of the normative 
assumptions underlying the process of European integration.182 
Dynamic interpretation of the citizenship provisions contained in 
constitutive treaties of the EU has expanded the power of the ECJ rel-
ative to the member states.183 The Court does this in three ways.184 First, 
it defines the outer limits of EU law in an expansive manner.185 Second, 
it transforms former market rights into citizenship rights that do not 
depend on economic activity.186 Third, it develops new remedies that 
accompany the enforcement of citizenship rights, and makes these di-
rectly applicable against the member states.187 The result of this process 
is that the vagueness of the citizenship provisions of treaty law is con-
strued in a manner which favors social integration and nondiscrimina-
tion on the basis of nationality.188 In this way, the Court has followed 
the spirit of the TFEU even when its decisions have only a tenuous 
basis in the treaty’s language.189 
In constructing Article 18 as creating an individually-enforceable 
right, the court both pressured EU member states to implement the 
treaty and opened an avenue for immigrants to challenge their treat-
ment on the basis of equal standing under the law. In doing so, the 
court affirmed its ability to weigh in on issues which fell outside the 
 
 180.  Id. (“[T]he progressive extension of intra-European welfare is an extraordinary example 
of how the bits and pieces of integration redefine competencies and intervene in virtually 
all areas of national law and policy.”). 
 181.  Id. 
 182.  Id. (noting that the Court’s decisions alter the social contract between member states 
and citizens/residents).  
 183.  Jacobi, supra note 28, at 645 (describing the Court’s “intentionalist interpretive ap-
proach” to removing barriers to integration on an ad-hoc basis).  
 184.  Id. 
 185.  Id.. 
 186.  Id. 
 187.  Id. 
 188.  Id. (highlighting the Court’s “aggressive interpretation of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU), which takes its spirit and objective—namely the crea-
tion and sustenance of an integrated European market—into greater consideration than 
the text of the Treaty itself”). 
 189.  Id. 
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realm of economics. Welfare therefore provides a prime example of 
how Union citizenship “penetrates and subverts national citizenship” 
despite the TFEU’s language stating that it is simply “additional to” 
national citizenship.190 
The Peculiar Phenomenon of European Citizenship 
Evaluating the Utilitarian Reciprocity Model of Citizenship 
On what basis does EU citizenship create a special relationship 
between citizens and the member states, one that is sufficient to justify 
providing welfare to European migrants? Scholars have addressed this 
question under varying theoretical perspectives.191 Pavlos Eleftheriadis 
has suggested that citizenship should not be centered around the ideals 
underlying the formation of the EU – including distributive justice and 
nation-building – but rather, reciprocity.192 Reciprocity forms the basis 
of the general social contract undergirding the state and providing it 
with legitimacy.193 It also forms the basis for state compliance with 
international agreements and treaty-based law.194 
Under a reciprocity model, discrimination against non-national 
EU citizens is unjustified from the utilitarian standpoint of a member 
state wishing that its own nationals are not subject to reciprocal dis-
criminatory treatment.195 This explains why supranational citizenship 
mainly provides rights to citizens in political communities other than 
their own, and why a special relationship between citizens and the EU 
 
 190.  Kostakopoulou, supra note 78 (“European citizenship penetrates and subverts national 
citizenship, thereby triggering off tensions, institutional displacement and the incremen-
tal transformation of domestic structures and practices in ways that had not been antici-
pated.”). 
 191.  See Eleftheriadis, infra note 208, at 786-87 (describing other scholars’ conclusions and 
proposing a new formation of citizenship based on the principle of reciprocity).  
 192.  See Eleftheriadis, infra note 208, at 787-89.  
 193.  See Eleftheriadis, infra note 208, at 787-89; see also John Rawls, POLITICAL 
LIBERALISM 50 (1993) (“Reasonable persons [desire] a social world in which they, as 
free and equal, can cooperate with others on terms all can accept. They insist that reci-
procity should hold within that world so that each benefits along with others.”).  
 194.  See Eleftheriadis, infra note 208, at 789-90 (arguing that “[r]eciprocity over many in-
teractions is . . . a much better model for why states obey international law”). 
 195.  See Habermas, supra note 57, at 13 (“From the utilitarian point of view, one could try 
to establish these special duties by indicating the mutual benefit a community would 
gain through the reciprocal performances of some act . . . [this] justifies a prohibition 
against the exploitation of guest workers through the reciprocity of special duties and 
rights.”) 
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is absent; the “special relationship” is actually a multilateral one 
among the states of the EU.196 Thus, EU citizenship is not a separate 
status independent from national citizenship, but rather a group of 
rights reciprocally afforded to non-nationals under the multilateral 
framework of the EU.197 
However, this model does not address some of the issues sur-
rounding European immigration, such as the question of what should 
be done about migrants who cannot contribute to the economy of the 
member state accepting them, and the practical reality that immigration 
flows reflect the balance of political and economic power between the 
member states, and are thus inherently non-reciprocal.198 As such, it is 
hard to justify the imposition of special duties between member states 
and EU national migrants solely upon the basis of reciprocity – espe-
cially in the welfare context.199 Moreover, reciprocity cannot explain 
the substance of the Court’s holding in D’Hoop, which protected an 
EU citizen’s rights against their own national government on the basis 
of the supranational right to move and reside freely contained in Arti-
cle 21 of the TFEU.200 The Belgian government gained no discernable 
reciprocal benefit from complying with the judgement in that it per-
tained solely to its own nationals’ eligibility for a social allowance. 
The decision was based on a moral principle of equal treatment which 
overrides the national interest in determining welfare eligibility.201 
Similarly, Zambrano involved a member state’s treatment of a TCN 
whose country of origin did not belong to the EU and how that treat-
ment bore upon the rights of a citizen of that state under EU law.202 
 
 196.  See Eleftheriadis, infra note 208, at 778 (“The main content of European citizenship is 
not, therefore, a complete scheme of political status or social protection, but a certain 
right to equal treatment by other political communities.”). 
 197.  See Eleftheriadis, infra note 208, at 792 (arguing that “the nationals of the European 
Union do not derive a separate status of citizenship from the Union, but only rights under 
reciprocity, whenever they become active economic agents or stakeholders in another 
member state”). 
 198.  See Eleftheriadis, infra note 208, at 792. 
 199.  See Habermas, supra note 57, at 13-14.  
 200.  See D’Hoop at ¶ 30. 
 201.  Id. at ¶ 34 (“[T]he national legislation thus places at a disadvantage certain of its na-
tionals simply because they have exercised their freedom to move . . . [s]uch inequality 
of treatment is contrary to the principles which underpin the status of citizen of the Un-
ion, that is, the guarantee of the same treatment in law.”).  
 202.  See Zambrano at ¶ 42-44.  
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Thus, the ECJ has stepped beyond what reciprocity alone might 
justify. The Court has recast integration as a social, rather than eco-
nomic process, in each of its decisions protecting EU citizens as per-
sons – not workers.203 D’Hoop showed that European citizenship could 
create legal rights against a person’s member state of origin, expanding 
the concept of EU citizenship beyond the notion of mere reciprocity to 
encompass true nondiscrimination in determining who is eligible for 
welfare. Most importantly, these cases emphasize that the issue of so-
cial entitlement is to be interpreted by the ECJ under EU law, rather 
than individually by each state.204 Given the pressures on the modern 
welfare state in an austerity-stricken Europe, this means that the social 
assistance programs of the states comprising the EU will rise and fall 
together.205 In other words, reciprocity squares best with the old, eco-
nomic model of European Community law – a position from which the 
Court has moved on.206 
European Citizenship and the Democratic Deficit 
The Court of Justice has stated that Union citizenship is the “fun-
damental status” of nationals of the individual member states.207 Still, 
European citizenship demonstrates several peculiar features. While 
European citizenship is referred to as “additional to . . . national citi-
zenship” in the TFEU, a would-be European citizen does not invoke 
her supranational rights unless she leaves her member state of origin 
 
 203.  See Martinsen, supra note 8, at 109 (“The European dimension of welfare has come to 
cover all citizens of the Union, irrespective of their economic status. Attached as the 
social security dimension is to the free movement of persons, it confirms that European 
citizenship has indeed been ascribed a substantial content.”). 
 204.  See Martinsen, supra note 8, at 110 (stating that “territorial principles as effective 
means to demarcate welfare are subject to further challenge by Community law” and 
speculating that European politicians will have a difficult time challenging the Court’s 
decisions given the need for unanimity among states and the “autonomy and authorita-
tive position of the Court”).  
 205.  See Martinsen, supra note 8, at 110 (framing this issue as a collective action problem 
since “it only takes one Member State out of twenty-five to agree with the interpretations 
of the Court and politics will not be in a collective position to act”).  
 206.  See Hailbronner, supra note 170, at 1264 (noting the importance of “the transition from 
purely economic to social membership for Union citizens”). 
 207.  See Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk v. Centre Public d’AideSociale, 2001 E.C.R. I-6193 ¶ 
31. 
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and travels to another member state.208 In other words, an EU citizen 
receives no rights against their member state of origin by virtue of their 
“complementary” EU citizenship.209 Moreover, the rights and duties 
that traditionally connect a citizen to a state, such as raising and dis-
tributing taxes, do not exist between a citizen and the EU.210 Finally, 
there is marked tension between the principle of European citizenship 
complementing national citizenship and the reality that the former sup-
plants the latter whenever there is a conflict.211 
The tension between national and Union citizenship highlights 
two interrelated concerns about the impact of integration on Europe-
ans’ political rights: first, the eroding power of national legislative 
bodies, and second, the increasing distance between individual “citi-
zens” and the supranational bodies governing Europe – this has been 
termed the “democratic deficit.”212 This argument starts from the theo-
retical perspective that as the size of a citizenry increases, the ability 
of an individual citizen to effect political change decreases as a func-
tion of the number of individual participants in the political commu-
nity.213 When the polity grows too large, political bargaining takes 
place at the level of technocratic and bureaucratic elites as the need for 
delegation of responsibilities grows.214 
 
 208.  See, e.g., Pavlos Eleftheriadis, The Content of European Citizenship, 15 GERMAN L.J. 
777, 779 (2014) (“Only persons who have exercised movement in the European Union 
enjoy the right of European Citizenship.”). 
 209.  Id. 
 210.  Id. at 778 (“There are few rights and duties connecting European citizens to the Euro-
pean Union itself. The Union does not raise its own taxes, nor does it have its own social 
welfare arrangements  . . . [a]ll political rights are exercised through the Member States. 
All social rights are dependent on national schemes.”).  
 211.  See id. (“A theory of European citizenship must accommodate the peculiar phenome-
non of Union citizenship existing side by side with that of the member states . . . [b]ut 
how is it possible that these parallel special bonds do not conflict with each other?”). 
 212.  See Menéndez, supra note 10, at 2 (arguing that “Sala and Baumbast have . . . exacer-
bated the processes of Europeanisation of what used to be exclusive national compe-
tences, and the judicialisation of decision-making processes where representative insti-
tutions used to have the exclusive word” and that therefore “the story about the 
unstoppable emancipation of European citizens from their national and economic chains 
is simply wrong”). See generally Thomas Jensen, The Democratic Deficit of the Euro-
pean Union, LIVING REV. IN DEMO. 2009, at 1-3.   
 213.  See Thomas Jensen, The Democratic Deficit of the European Union, LIVING REV. IN 
DEMO. 2009, at 1 (“As the size of a polity increases, the possibility of effective citizen 
participation decreases as a function of the time needed to express one’s views.”).  
 214.  Id. 
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This formulation of democratic participation, as applied to the EU, 
holds that the increasing competencies of European institutions and 
corresponding limits on national policymaking discretion inevitably 
reduce the effectiveness of democratic political participation.215 De-
spite the expanding rights provided by EU citizenship, citizens lack an 
effective vehicle to actually control policy.216 At worst, the result of 
this deficit could be a European polity that has fundamental disagree-
ments with the direction and shape that the EU is taking.217 
Under the democratic deficit theory, the ECJ has arguably made 
Europe less democratic through its forays into national welfare policy 
under the banner of nondiscrimination. Agustín José Menéndez criti-
cizes the Sala decision and its importance as a precedent in other re-
lated cases on this basis.218 First, Menendez argues that forcing “Euro-
peanization through judicialisation” overextends EU law into areas 
which should be left to national governments.219 In addition, Sala and 
the turn to supranational citizenship promotes “non-solidaristic” logic 
by emphasizing individual rights under EU law, rather than the com-
mon good, as a basis for ECJ decisions.220 Finally, Menendez holds 
that Sala created poor distributive outcomes by privileging workers 
with the ability to cross national boundaries and therefore receive the 
rights promised by the TFEU.221 
Menendez does not claim to reject Europeanization in and of it-
self; rather, he writes that when “Europeanisation entails a shift of 
power from representative political institutions to courts,” it exacer-
bates the democratic deficit inherent in supranationalism.222 In his 
 
 215.  Id. (“If the democratic ideal is maximum citizen participation, then large-scale repre-
sentative structures will inevitably fall short in comparison to their smaller counter-
parts.”).  
 216.  Id.; see also Habermas, supra note 57, at 6 (“For the citizen, this translates into an ever 
greater gap between being affected by something and participating in changing it . . . 
politics has gradually become a matter of administration, of processes that undermine 
the status of the citizen and deny the republican meat of such status.”).  
 217.  Thomas Jensen, The Democratic Deficit of the European Union, LIVING REV. IN DEMO. 
2009, at 1-3; see also Habermas, supra note 57, at 8 (“Given that the role of citizen has 
hitherto only been institutionalized at the level of nation-states, citizens have no effec-
tive means of debating European decisions and influencing the decisionmaking pro-
cesses.”). 
 218.  See Menéndez, supra note 10, at 2.  
 219.  See Menéndez, supra note 10, at 36.  
 220.  See Menéndez, supra note 10, at 2-3. 
 221.  See Menéndez, supra note 10, at 36. 
 222.  See Menéndez, supra note 10, at 37. 
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view, the “million euro question” of welfare policy – determining eli-
gibility – cannot be taken out of the hands of national governments 
without causing backlash among member states.223 Menendez also 
states that ECJ meddling in the social policies of individual govern-
ments might deter them from increasing welfare benefits on the basis 
that a future ECJ decision expanding the scope of entitlements could 
cause program costs to spiral out of control.224 
In addressing Menendez’s claims regarding the possibility that the 
turn toward supranational citizenship is anti-democratic, one must 
keep in mind that the overall aim of Article 18 of the TFEU and related 
ECJ jurisprudence is to empower those individuals who lack a voice in 
national parliaments in the first place – namely, immigrants.225 These 
people may find it harder to participate in traditional politics, or worse, 
encounter a population or parliament which is hostile to them simply 
due to xenophobia. Immigrant groups within societies are too frag-
mented and differentiated to constitute a single political coalition that 
could appeal to the legislature.226 
Immigrants, despite contributing to the economy overall in terms 
of productivity, add pressure to already-burdened low-income workers 
with national citizenship due to labor competition.227 Disparate immi-
grant groups also pitted against each other in a similar manner.228 The 
result is that political alliances among migrant workers, or migrant 
workers and other low-income workers, are nearly impossible.229 As 
such, nationalist economic populism and anti-migrant sentiment are far 
more salient in national political discourse (and consequently, legisla-
tive debate) than before the courts. 
 
 223.  See Menéndez, supra note 10, at 39 (“It is surely the case that a common citizenship 
should entail a modicum of solidarity towards the nationals of other Member States, but 
that does not wipe out the million euro question of any welfare policy, which is deter-
mining who is and who is not eligible.”).  
 224.  See Menéndez, supra note 10, at 40. 
 225.  See Ryner, supra note 29, at 67.  
 226.  Id. (noting how “welfare state constituencies . . . are increasingly fragmented within 
societies” and arguing that “[t]he idea of mobilising an adequate solidarity among these 
‘strangers’ is a daunting task.”).  
 227.  Id. 
 228.  Id. 
 229.  Ryner, supra note 29, at 68 (“Hence, rather than forming alliances to counter the neo-
liberal project of economic restructuring, immigrants and nationalist welfare state con-
stituencies are pitted against each other, and this generates sub-optimal outcomes for 
both groups, and adds further to the momentum of neo-liberalism.”).  
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By contrast, the principle of direct effect, when combined with the 
TFEU’s more social view of citizenship, provides a means for immi-
grants to appeal to a body other than the one which is actively discrim-
inating against them.230 Anti-discrimination provisions exist precisely 
in order to check against the worst abuses of democratic processes. By 
creating new legal rights at the national level, the directly-effective 
judgments of the citizenship cases have made discrete adjudication by 
the courts a more effective form of redress for migrants than reliance 
on legislative institutions. Moreover, the legal rights created by the cit-
izenship cases (and the national court decisions interpreting them) are 
shared by all non-member state minorities with Union citizenship, ad-
dressing the problem of immigrant groups being pitted against each 
other.231 
It should also be noted that the Maastricht treaty and TFEU were 
signed (with some minor reservations) by all the member states’ 
elected national representatives.232 So long as the ECJ decisions on cit-
izenship fall within the framework set up by these treaties and logically 
contribute to the integration of Europe, they do not meaningfully create 
a new democratic deficit. Supranational citizenship is the best mecha-
nism to facilitate such integration; vesting the concept with legal 
weight is thus entirely reasonable and necessary.233 Even more im-
portantly, discrimination on the basis of nationality is a direct impedi-
ment to participation in the political process at both the national and 
supranational level.234 Preventing such discrimination is therefore in 
line with a democratic view of European citizenship.235 While the po-
litical rights of migrant EU citizens were guaranteed by treaty and im-
plementing directives, rather than ECJ cases, access to basic social 
welfare is a precondition of exercising these rights.236 
 
 230.  See infra Part III.A (outlining the cases that applied non-discrimination principles to 
national determinations of immigrant welfare rights.). 
 231.  Ryner, supra note 29, at 68. 
 232.  See infra Part II.A (describing the origins of the TFEU).  
 233.  See Jacobi, supra note 28, at 645, 651 (noting the “prominence” of the ECJ in this policy 
arena).  
 234.  See Ryner, supra note 29, at 67-68 (noting the barriers faced by immigrants in attempt-
ing to organize politically).  
 235.  See Habermas, supra note 57, at 11 (“A concept of citizenship, the normative content 
of which has been dissociated from that of national identity, cannot allow arguments for 
restrictive and obstructionist asylum or immigration policies.”). 
 236.  See Marshall, supra note 59, at 36 (showing how social rights create the conditions 
wherein political rights can be exercised as part of the development of citizenship).  
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Menendez also claims that the Sala court’s intrusion into the wel-
fare policies of member states may make the EU less social.237 
“Whereas the extension of economic freedoms to non-nationals may 
result in a positive-sum game,” he writes, “that is not necessarily the 
case when we are dealing with welfare benefits, which institutionalise 
what some citizens owe others, and thus necessarily entail a redistri-
bution of resources.”238 Yet the claim that the concept of EU citizen-
ship as articulated in Sala marks an “individualistic” turn in EU law, 
as opposed to a collective European identity, correctly identifies a 
trend but draws the wrong conclusions.239 
To argue that the EC “economic citizen” framework was more so-
cial because it focused on universally endorsed “public goods,” pre-
sumably economic growth, mistakenly implies that decisions under 
that framework were uncontroversial and did not create winners and 
losers as well.240  Allowing free movement of workers inherently risks 
displacing domestic labor.  The EC was politically contentious and cre-
ated individually-enforceable rights using the figure of the economic 
citizen, so Sala was not qualitatively different in this respect.241 
In other words, EC/EU law did not become any more individual-
istic in respect to individual rights after Sala.  It simply changed the 
basis for said rights by removing the need for a claimant to be econom-
ically active.242 Unless one is against Maastricht and the TFEU them-
selves, it seems hard to fault the ECJ for its social and supranational 
definition of EU citizenship-given that one main purpose for these trea-
ties was to take the project of European integration beyond economics 
alone.243 Universal human rights, such as freedom from discrimination 
on the basis of nationality, are public goods themselves even if they do 
not necessarily generate economic growth (although they certainly 
 
 237.  Menéndez, supra note 10, at 39. 
 238.  Id. 
 239.  See Hailbronner, supra note 170, at 1264 (noting the importance of “the transition from 
purely economic to social membership for Union citizens”). 
 240.  See supra Part I.A (outlining the cases in which the Court was forced to choose between 
a restrictive interpretation of the freedom of movement based on economic integration, 
and a more expansive one that prefigured the deepening of social relations as well).  
 241.  See Dieter Kraus at ¶¶ 16-22 (ruling on a migrant worker’s claim for discriminatory 
violation of the freedom of movement).  
 242.  See Sala at ¶ 65 
 243.  See Kostakopoulou, at 627-28.  
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facilitate it).  Sala, therefore, did not make the EU anti-social in any 
important way. 
The final question of the distributive implications of Sala seems 
the least worrisome of Menendez’s concerns.  Although logically,  
there is some truth to the belief  that only some newly-empowered EU 
citizens have the means to take advantage of the rights conferred by 
Sala, it seems hard to imagine how they could do so directly at the 
expense of those who lack such means.244  The criticism of the expan-
sion of new rights on the basis that some citizens can secure them bet-
ter than others does not rise to the level of undermining the justification 
of creating said rights. Imperfect redistributive outcomes are likely in-
evitable whenever new freedoms are conceived.245 
Ensuring migrants’ access to welfare, via the application of non-
discrimination principles, is a first step toward making the freedom of 
movement available to all – not just those with the means to migrate 
without relying on social assistance.  Menendez cites the “deterrent 
effect” –  the possibility that states will limit welfare expenditures out 
of fear of an adverse ECJ decision – which is also fairly improbable.246  
Even in the wake of the citizenship cases, states may require an appli-
cant to prove a bona fide connection to the state so long as this does 
not discriminate on the basis of nationality.247 As long as entitlement is  
chiefly  determined by national government authorities, the possibility 
of a deterrent effect seems remote. 
Finally, the democratic processes of the member states may be the 
exact reason why the ECJ is the best-positioned institutional body 
within the EU to push supranational citizenship by expansively inter-
preting the TFEU’s citizenship provisions.248  National politics play a 
small  role in the decisions of the Court, as compared to the EU’s other 
institutions, because the Court’s decisions must be overturned 
 
 244.  See supra Part II.A (showing the conflicts between domestic workers and migrant labor 
in postwar Europe).  
 245.  See HeliAskola, Tale of Two Citizenships? Citizenship, Migration and Care in the Eu-
ropean Union, 21(3) Soc. & L. Studies 341, 341-65 (2012) (arguing that from a feminist 
perspective, freedom of movement is an example of gendered citizenship); supra Part 
I.B (describing litigation over the then-new rights created by Community law).  
 246.  See Menéndez, supra note 10, at 40 (referencing “distributive outcomes” of the citizen-
ship cases).  
 247.  See Collins at ¶ 65. 
 248.  See Martinsen, supra note 8, at 110. 
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unanimously via collective action by the member states.249  The Court 
is thereby able to take a step-by-step approach, gradually expanding 
the scope of citizenship rights based on the cases before it and its in-
stitutional capital.250 
The issue of Article 21’s direct effect demonstrates the importance 
of Sala and its progeny.251 The Sala case was a strategic first step; since 
Ms. Sala was already lawfully residing in Germany and was a de facto 
naturalized citizen, the Court was able to rely on the nondiscrimination 
provision of Article 18 without going so far as to give direct effect to 
Article 21.252  But by the time Baumbast was decided, the Court had 
sufficient confidence in Sala’s reasoning to extend it that additional 
weight.253 This step-by-step approach effectively extended the citizen 
rights contained in the TFEU while affirming the Court’s own compe-
tence to rule on matters on national social policy.254 The retrospective 
nature of judicial decision-making ensures that the law develops with 
particular consideration for the actual circumstances affecting social 
welfare policy while ensuring that determinations of eligibility under 
national schemes are consistent with the citizenship provisions of EU 
law. Not all “deficits” are created equal. 
Conclusion 
Ultimately, the debate over the importance and wisdom of the cit-
izenship decisions is simply a microcosm for ongoing arguments re-
garding the role of supranational institutions in crafting a new, trans-
national European identity. Worries regarding democratic deficits, 
judicialization of national competencies and inequitable distributive 
outcomes are often levied at the EU as a whole. Although Article 20 
of the TFEU explicitly states that EU citizenship does not replace that 
of nations, domestic policymakers in member states will likely 
 
 249.  Id. 
 250. See Zoe Egelman, The Evolution of Citizenship Adjudication in the European Union, 
YALE REV. INT’L STUD. 1 (2012) (referring to the Sala case as a stepping-stone to the 
direct applicability of the TFEU’s citizenship provisions).  
 251.  Id. 
 252.  Id. (“In Martinez Sala, because the appellant was for all purposes a “de facto” member 
of German society, it was easy for the Court to invoke her rights under Article 17 EC. 
This reasoning was the necessary stepping-stone that, once established in ECJ precedent, 
would later enable the Court to render Article 17 EC directly effective [in Baumbast].”). 
 253.  Id. 
 254.  See supra Part III.B (describing the impact of the citizenship cases on European inte-
gration). 
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continue to view decisions of the ECJ which erode their decision-mak-
ing competencies with skeptical eyes. 
Is the process of Europeanization a top-down or bottom-up pro-
cess? The perception that a panel of unelected judges with no back-
ground in welfare policy are handing down decisions which determine 
the “million-euro question” of who can stay on the dole is certainly not 
positive for the optics of Europeanization, evincing a top-down ap-
proach. In the current environment of austerity, it is undeniable that 
social policy – and the balance of power between states and EU insti-
tutions – has become an extremely politicized issue. The Court must 
tread carefully. 
However, the importance of the citizenship cases in the develop-
ment of a connected, social Europe cannot be denied. In defining the 
rights of European citizens as persons, rather than workers, the ECJ 
took a critical step forward in constructively constituting the European 
Union as something more than a multilateral, reciprocal framework for 
economic integration. As the institutional actor best positioned within 
the EU to carry the banner of supranationalism, the ECJ will continue 
to play a role in reconstituting the meaning and orientation of citizen-
ship as the European experiment marches on. For European citizens 
facing discrimination at the hands of member state governments, the 
continuing vigilance of the ECJ in defending immigrants’ welfare 
rights serves as a reminder of their inherent worth and an example of 
sovereignty yielding to justice. 
 
